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When delivered as a live performance this text is punctuated
with the display of interactive media, sometimes with
commentary, sometimes without. In this text appropriately
illustrative pieces are named. There is no way to word up,
describe or account for what is done using the interactive
media artefacts. The best I can hope for is that you find those
works for yourselves and having experienced them reflect on
the text of the paper. Or if you can not find them, then
experience some others and reflect on the text. If the words
here have any relevance then they should apply to all
instances, and not only to my carefully selected materials.
Brunswick Parking Lot [7]
AN OBSERVATION
Thomas Kuhn, talking about the history of ‘normal science’
makes the point that much time and energy is spent in having
to explain things again and again because they are not shared
and can not be taken for granted.
Being able to take no body of belief for granted, each writer
on physical optics felt forced to build his field anew from its
foundations. In doing so his choice of supporting observation
and experiment was relatively free, for there was no standard
set of methods or of phenomena that every optical writer felt
forced to employ and explain. ….. That pattern is not
unfamiliar in a number of creative fields today, nor is it
incompatible with significant discovery and invention.
Kuhn, [1]
These comments characterise the activities of scientists in the
period preceding the establishment of a ‘normal science’
either before the body of knowledge in a field is established,
or at times when the existing body of knowledge is found to
be inadequate. ‘Normal science’ for Kuhn comes at a time
when scientists in a given field share a paradigm of ideas
about what it is appropriate to measure through
experimentation. With that paradigm in place the field
develops rapidly, partly because less energy is used up in
reworking definitions or advancing and countering competing
views of what makes up the field in the first place.
With Kuhn’s perspective in mind, at the start of this
discussion of semiosis, cybernetics, and the aesthetics of the
interactive it is as well to make clear certain terms and ideas.
Firstly, and most importantly, the way in which the word
‘interactive’ is used. This is because there is a general sense to
the word ‘interactive’, and a specialised sense. In the general
sense everything is interactive because we enter into a
discourse of signs and cognition with it, a discourse which has
been seen as ‘hermeneutic’ and which is essentially a sign
process of syntagmatic-selection (syntagmurgy – see note 1).
In the specialised sense, when it is used of particular instances
of things which are usually (but not always nor necessarily)
mediated through digital technologies, fewer things are
interactive because the discourse of signs and cognition that
goes with those things is unlike the discourse that goes with
other things. That discourse includes and involves a dualled-
syntagmurgy derived essentially from the cybernetic loop of
interactivity and the quandary of physicality that typifies such
things.
The number of things that are described by this specialised
meaning is, of course, increasing, and the interactive, in this
sense, has become an important location of cultural activities
– economic activities, artistic activities, communication acts,
entertainments, functions and distractions of many kinds are
now located within the things that are described by this
meaning. Indeed, the experience of the interactive, in one
form or another, is an increasingly common day-to-day
activity for many people in the technonomies of the world,
and a preferred form of leisure time engagement. So much so
that the sign systems (the languages) of the interactive are
among the most commonly used languages.
Reminding ourselves of this difference in meaning, and
rehearsing that difference, will establish an essential
characteristic of the interactive which plays upon all
subsequent discussion of it, and will return us to the main
point of the discussion which is the way in which the language
of Mouse operates and how it contributes to the aesthetics of
the interactive, the defining qualities of the experience of the
discourse that is the interactive, in  this specialised sense.
Here, the aesthetics of the interactive is about the experience
of experiencing the interactive. It is not about judging the
interactive in any terms of beauty derived from arbitrary
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histories or beliefs about how things should be. The aesthetics
of the interactive is about enabling an effective discussion of
the experience of the interactive in all its diversity, in all its
various forms. It implies that there is a cognate thing, or set of
things, that share enough characteristics to be classed together
and labelled as the interactive – including such things as web
based search engines, medical record databases, word-
processors, text adventure games, image editing software,
online tax returns, shoot’em’up games, interactive installation
artworks, spreadsheets, digital camera photo-album software,
soundtoys – and that there is a commonality to the way in
which the can be described, discussed and analysed.
Small Fish [8]
DIFFERENTIATION: HERMENEUTICS,
SEMIOTICS, SYNTAGMURGY
There is a general sense of the word interactive, a common
place meaning, which is a truism – everything is interactive
because we interact with it. A painting, for example, is
interactive because in looking at it we are in some form of
discourse with it. This can be represented as a simple diagram
in which two entities exist separately and overlap mutually.
In this diagram the area of overlap stands for the ‘moment of
discourse’, and we would generally identify the two entities as
(something like) a text and a reader. Identifying, usually, a set
of signs (the text), and a receiver/processor of those signs (the
reader).
Figure 1
And it is this sense, initially, that all things are interactive
because to ‘know’ some thing is to somehow have
experienced a shared discourse with it (or, of course, more
accurately with the signs that make it up, or, more accurately
still, to have experienced the sensation of the perception and
cognition of those signs and to have related that sign system to
more or less shared cultural conditions of meaningfulness). In
each moment of discourse there is a making of meanings.
Those meanings are contingent on the moment, they are fickle
and shift from and between each moment of discourse as the
meanings play through transient syntagmatic:paradigmatic
states. Our reading at any one moment of discourse is
dependent on that moment and quite possibly differs markedly
from other readings and the readings of others, which are
themselves the experience of other moments of discourse.
“By tradition, the relationship between audience and artwork
has been analysed as an active one characterized by
“interpretation”. According to traditional notions,
interpretation changes the artwork (e.g., the reader
“acquires” the text, thus changing its meaning into something
different). ….. the relationship between the audience and the
artwork is “hermeneutic”… this particular form of
observational relationship between an audience and the sign
object in which the interpretative observation changes the
meaning of the sign object. From here stems the notion of a
circular process constituted by artwork and observer, the so-
called hermeneutic circle.”
Qvortup [2]
Our general understanding of the continuity of the physical
world requires that the text, a painting, say, or a sculpture, is
much the same between our moments of discourse, and is,
itself unaffected by those moments of discourse – the text has
a fixed materiality (which is the paradigm of signs that
constitutes all the sign needed to ‘read’ the text;object),
remaining consistently the same for different viewers and for
a viewer’s own, individual moments of discourse. Unless the
text is physically changed in some way, damaged, vandalised,
reworked  – in which case, as it is different and no longer the
(original) text so the discourse is necessarily different – it is
understood to have a consistency and fixity across and
between viewings. We have no great troubles with this in our
quotidian existences. Indeed, the very basis of social worlds
can be understood as requiring a clear and certain acceptance
of the continuity of the physical world, of the fixity of the
materiality of things.
This experience of (or belief in) the material fixity of an
object (the text) seems initially to be at odds with the idea of
the hermeneutic experience. The fixity of the object
contradicts the supposedly ‘subjective’ nature of the
interpretation, and one or the other seems counter-intuitive.
The material fixity of things is bound in, at an existential
level, with the signs that make them up – the paradigm of the
text. There can be no signs that are not material, and there can
be no signs of the text:object beyond its materiality where
materiality is bounded by and defined as the presence of the
object:sign in the (human) sensorium – I have discussed this
previously and elsewhere, and will return to it here, later.
Viewed from the perspective of semiotics the ‘hermeneutic’
process can be described as the making of a selection from the
broader paradigm of signs that constitutes the text to form a
selection, or syntagm of a particular ‘reading’, ‘interpretaion’
or, viewed the other way round, ‘utterance’.
Figure2
In this diagram the ‘text’ (to the right, my humanist
acculturation through European print conventions requires  me
to place the most important thing to the left, here the ‘reader’
(individual, human, being, living) is more important that the
text (inanimate, reproducible)) is made up of a paradigm of
signs – rectangular blocks - and the hermeneutic process
includes only a selection (syntagm) of those signs for its
interpretation (the greyed blocks in the area of overlap).
This selection, this forming of the syntagmatic sub-set from
the paradigm which is all the possible signs (and materiality)
of the text will feature in this discussion severally, I will use
the term syntagmurgy for it (see note 1). In hermeneutics this
syntagmurgic process is one of reception and interpretation,
the reading of the (current and continuously changing)
syntagm of signs from the text:object.
It is clear that we experience things severally and differently,
they differ from moment of discourse to moment of discourse
for ourselves, and the interpretation varies. This can be
accounted for in one way by changes in ourselves between
viewings – psychological changes, life events, present
concerns, the transient effects of diet, intoxication, fatigue, the
mood of our companions, whatever…… In another way this
can be accounted for by different bodies of prior knowledge,
varying skills of viewing between different vieings and,
between individuals…… Concentration, modified and
manipulated by all those thing that affect us, is syntagmurgy,
and even though the text is fixed, the discourse is dynamic as
the reader continuously shifts and changes within one moment
of discourse and between others. In this the reader constitutes
a specially fluid text and the signs included in the syntagm of
perception (and so, what the text is understood as) vary during
and between moments of discourse.
The conditions of the reader create a dynamic process of
syntagmurgy. The ‘internal’ signs of the reader (their
knowledge, associations, concerns, interests, etc) all influence
and modify the syntagmurgy, and the syntagmurgy modifies
the reader by becoming part of the ‘internal’ signs.
The important point, here, is that the location of syntagmurgy
is within the reader. The object:text exists materially, and as a
complete paradigm of all the possible signs that can be read as
the text:object but not as all the signs that can make up the
discourse for the reader, too, brings a body of signs to the
discourse. And it is in this sense that we ‘interact’ with
everything, and that interaction is ‘hermeneutic’.
Figure 3
Represented in this diagram by the leftmost ellipse and the
circles it contains, several factors influence the syntagmurgy
of the reader. The ‘hermeneutic’ interpretation of the text is
dependent on how these factors inform the act of reading the
text, which signs from the paradigm that makes up the text are
noticed and in which order. These are such things as
preoccupations, obsessions, associations, concentration and
the mental skills of the prepared or trained mind.
The syntagmurgic process of reading a text necessarily varies
from reader to reader as their conditions are particular to
them. Although acculturation means that the members of a
given community will have a shared general reading of a text
(the process of acculturation prepares the mind for all acts of
readings, puts in place prepared syntagmurgic processes),
individual readings will vary, and cultural readings will vary
across time. In this way the material text holds polysemy, its
meanings vary even as all its signs are fixed because
syntagmurgic processes render signs into readings. All
readings then become aberrant readings because there is no
one reading which is more definitive or more privileged than
any other.
Syntagmurgy is not only a reception of signs. While the
reading of text can involve an active searching for signs (an
active viewing of an iamge, say, where the eye:mind searches
the image, tracks between areas to resolve a discrepancy in the
sign systems such as a visual pun where a sign functions
indexically for one meaning and iconically for another) in
another form, the process of selecting from a paradigm creates
utterances. These two syntagmurgies go side-by-side, and
turn-by-turn, reception leading to creation leading to
reception. In some instances such as conversation, dance
improvisation, jazz jamming, performance art, the two forms
of syntagmurgy flow across and through a rich interpersonal
understanding, fusing the syntagmurgies of reception and
creation into one. And in this sense a number of artforms are
interactive and often are characterised by an emergent and
ephemeral paradigm of signs.
The other meaning of interactive, the specialised meaning,
and the one which is central to this text and discussion is
about the discourse with a particular class of text, ones which
are, usually, mediated by digital computing technologies. The
thing that marks out this specialised meaning is the particular
and peculiar nature of those texts. Where a painting or
sculpture, a chair, crab or trumpet are taken to have physical
continuity (that is to say they embody the paradigm, and stay
the same across time and between viewings and viewers)
these texts have no such continuity, or no guarantee of such
continuity. Much of what notionally constitutes their
paradigm of signs is not material, and that which is material is
not necessarily the same for and during any moment of
discourse or between viewings. That is to say that much of
what will constitute the signs exists as ‘coded’ information,
held, stored, located beyond the human sensorium and
although having a physical form (as pits on a CD, or the
charges that make up bits in planes of doped silicon or ferro-
magnetic particles) they are not material. Even if we could
sense the pits on a CD the resulting sensation would not be the
same as the sound that would come from the same stream
when passed through CODEC hardware and software and
through loudspeakers, nor the image that might be made of it.
This is the quandary of materiality as it effects the interactive.
The encoded data is retrieved, used to generate displays and in
that it takes on materiality and meaning. In the interactive that
process is, of course, contingent on the reader’s actions in the
moment of discourse. Literally brought into being by the
discourse the interactive text is ephemeral and has an
emergent syntagmurgy of display which becomes the
paradigm that the hermeneutic syntagmurgy entrs into
discourse with . While its paradigm exists at a physical level it
only takes on materiality in the moments of its display.
Where in the general sense, the dynamic qualities of the
interactive come from the syntagmurgy of a reader’s
cognition, perception or position in relation to a fixed text, a
paradigm of signs embedded in a materiality; in the
specialised meaning that same syntagmurgic process of
cognition, perception, etc relates to a text that does not have
that fixity, it is itself a syntagmurgic instance drawn from an
otherwise unknowable paradigm of signs, that only take on
materiality in the instance of display. In the interactive the
syntagmurgies of reception and creation merge in a way
which is unlike that of other sign systems and the discourse
can not be reframed by moving through or around a material
text because it ain’t there.
Figure 4
In this diagram the bounding rectangle to the right and the
objects it contains represent the data paradigm of the text – the
information that can be used to construct a display – the
display itself being the material signs of the text, which are
represented by the solid line boxes in the right circle. This
selection of display sign from the data paradigm is
syntagmurgic. It comes about through the overlay of reader’s
actions with the algorithmic rules of the system. The data
paradigm can be thought of  as the database that for Manovich
is ‘traversed’. In interactive artefacts the invocation of
elements of the data paradigm as parts of the display syntagm
comes about as a consequence of the user’s actions, decisions,
choices, and in this is Aarseth’s idea of the ‘ergodic’ – the
outcome of ‘non-trivial’ actions in traversing an underlying
database.
Taken together, the hermeneutic interpretation that is acts of
reading, and the contingent, ‘ergodic’ process whereby
display is formed, constitute a dual-syntagmurgy which
characterises the interactive and is unlike other media forms
and experiences. It is in this dual-syntagmurgy that the
interactive (in its specialised sense) is differentiated from the
interactive in its more general sense. And with this comes
particular experiences and concerns that taken together define
the discourse of the interactive, and its aesthetics. This dually-
syntagmurgic relationship is a kind of two-way hermeneutics
– the user experiences a text/system and interprets it, the
system experiences a text/user and interprets it. The actions of
one provoke the display of the other. The displays of either
are the actions of the other. And this describes the loop of
communication and control that sits at the heart of all
cybernetic systems.
Obsession  [7]
INTERACTIVITY, SEMIOSIS,
CYBERNETICS
Interactivity here is understood as a ‘cybernetic loop’ in which
actions and displays are irrevocably linked as instances of
communication and control, and through which a semiotic
process runs (see figure xxx, below). That process is
inextricably bound up with spatial and temporal
juxtapositions, with real or apparent cause and effect, forming
the changes in pattern and of energy that are the basis of
semiosis, that create the differences and relationships which
are pre-requisites of signification.
In this cybernetic loop user and system mutually modify the
display of one and the actions of another in a dynamic dance
of syntagmurgies. Cause and effect sweeps clockwise, and
while the sweep may be erratic and irregular, it is
characterised by the continuity of the semiotic process in
which meaning is made, derived, sustained, confirmed,
replicated, denied. That process runs along an axis protruding
from the page. Viewed sideways on, the cybernetic loop
moves, helically, bolt-thread-like along that axis. Actions
prompt changes to display, and changes in display prompt
actions, and in the moments of action:display signs come into
being, meanings are made. Within the loop, display and action
blur in the form of rollover images, cursor movements, the tap
of a PDA stylus. They spin away in a melee of other feedback
loops spawned by acts of display and the display of actions,
by sensations and meanings.
In this cybernetic loop display is both communication and
control, and action is both control and communication.
Although there exists a clear separation and differentiation of
states within the loop, within the user (perception, cognition
and decision) and within the system (event/conditions, data
retrieval/calculation, assembly) there is no clear
differentiation between display and action, both are
communication both are control, and both are syntagmurgic.
The signs of action made by the user, the rolling of a mouse,
the tap of keys, the press of buttons, are in fact the display:text
viewed by the computer. The computer’s actions are in fact
the flickering signifiers of light, sound and vibration in and on
monitors, loudspeakers, trembling feedback devices, the
display:text the user reads.
Here, interactivity is understood to be inherently ‘narrative’ in
that it is time-based and driven by events. Structures of cause
and effect, the modification of meanings by juxtaposition in
space or sequence, connect the instances of action:display
within larger structures of meaning, and those larger
structures, themselves, have semiotic function.
Semiosis is located in the moments of action and display, in
the ‘manners’ of the devices in which juxtaposition and cause
and effect take place. Signs are patterns of energy, or changes
in patterns of energy which are both and at once signs of signs
and signs of their meanings which are derived in part from
their difference from other signs and from their juxtaposition
along with other signs. So, on rollover an area of the screen
changes colour. The sign is bound up in changes of energy, in
changes of the frequency of light, in changes of the electrical
current which controls the state of a range of cells in the
matrix of a TFT display. This area, and not other ones which
appear similar, changes. This area, and the ones around it have
features of colour that make them appear, quite illusorily, to
be embossed, to stand above the plane of the ground on which
they apparemtly rest. Shaded darker below and on the right,
and shaded lighter above and on the left, the illusion of
standing proud from the surface is both perceptual
(iconic/indexical) and forms a conventional sign (symbol). On
rollover the colours change, darker above and left, lighter
below and right, as if the surface recessed (the optical illusion
now confirmed by an impossible instant change of state, no
transition, no restraints of material form or gavity, no
resistance or momentum)……………… and so we could
detail the semiotic processes of display, and much work does
so. The concern here though will be less with the display (that
is the text) presented to the reader than with display (that is
the text) presented to the computer, that is with the devices
through which the reader acts – the mouse, keyboard, joystick,
etc..
Each instance of action:display constitutes a sign and carries a
literal denotative meaning (‘the mouse has moved forward,
and the cursor has moved proportionately across the screen
vertically’) and a connotative meaning that relates the sign to
the larger scale semiotic processes of the work (‘the
relationship of mouse movement to cursor movement is much
the same as it has always been, the system is working, the
system is reliable, the information the system displays is
believable’), and to underlying cultural myths about how the
world and the things it contains relate and work together.
Denotation, connotation and myth work together to form
affect, they way the signs work on and within the user’s
experiences, forming an  aesthetic of the interactive. These
sign processes are embedded and embodied in the
‘materialities’ of the system, the places where the signs are
present in the human sensorium, in the devices of display and
the devices of interaction.  The possibilities of signs are
constrained by the materiality of those devices, by their
‘manners’ of operation and display. The word ‘manners’ is
used carefully here. It relates to both the ‘manner’ of
operation of the devices as physical constructs, and also to the
‘manners’ of the devices in the sense of conventionalised and
constructed behaviours, in a sense like that of behaving
properly, of being well-mannered, or ill-mannered. And by
inference this suggests, perhaps, a normative state for those
devices, a body of expectations and performances that is to be
thought normal. Possibly even ‘the way things are’. Myths of
the natural embodied in mouse, monitor, action, display,
action.
These ‘manners’ can also be thought of as grammars of use,
or codes of use. Associated with those terms are paradigms (of
possibilities), and syntagms (of utterances). These ideas refer
also to concepts of langue and parole, competence and
performance – ideas about a range of potential states
articulated into a (necessarily) smaller range of actual states.
The paradigm includes all the possible ‘signs’ that constitute
the language of the device. It does not include all possible
states of the device as some states may not constitute signs
within the (currently normal) language paradigm.
The form, nature, grammars, codes, the ‘manners’ of devices,
flavour interactivity, exist as affect. Medium becomes
message in the movement and touch of a mouse and the
transient signifiers of the monitor or loudspeakers. Display
prompts action, communication contains the possibilities of
control. Algorithms of materialisation massage data into
syntagmatic instance drawn from the paradigm of all possible
displays of that data. Actions evoke instances of display. A
syntagmatic utterance of action, of using the mouse in a
particular way translates into a selection from the paradigm
that is the moment of discourse, and the syntagmatic display
Figure 5
 of that selection then forms the paradigm in which using the
mouse operates. Along the semiotic axis, where denotation
and connotation merge in message and meaning the qualities
of interactivity, the ‘manners’ of the devices, function
connotatively. Data brought into being as display takes on
meanings both literal and associative.
Audiorom [5]
mouseSigns
Understanding the use of a mouse through the structures of
cybernetic loop and syntagmurgy enables a  discussion of
mouseSigns at the nano-scale of a cursor moving across a
screen pixel by pixel, increment by increment, and at the scale
of grander narratives of myth, the larger scale semiotic
processes that form the aesthetic experience of the artefact as
a whole.
The primary signifucations of a mouse relate to movement
and to change, by which is meant the operation of a button
and the consequences of that act. It is important to
differentiate the signs that come from the use of the mouse
and the signs that represent that movement on screen. The
hand movement of the mouse is noticeably smooth. While the
screen display may be visually differentiated and may sign
changes in level, texture and even ‘limits’ to the extent of the
current display syntagm the common mouse provides no
haptic equivalent of bumping over a line, ascending a
buttonised edge, or being constrained in area. The display
representation of movement is entirely the outcome of
algorithmic operations. The appearance of the representation
as a cursor on screen, the way it moves, how it relates to the
movement of the hand, whether it jumps five pixels to the
right when running over a buttonised image, whether it stops
at a certain screen position, are all determined in code. The
interplay of algorithms is a syntagmurgic process which leads
to the instants of display. The arbitrariness of display then
should make more clear the rather limited and
conventionalised languages, the manners, that we employ.
The possibilities of algorithms are effectively unlimited, the
infinity of the paradigm of display is the play of the human
imagination.
Similarly, what the system registers is only movement (and
that is usually relative rather than absolute) and button
actions. It rarely registers the emotion with which the mouse
has been moved. And so the signs that are embodied in
movement become denatured. Refined into a reading of
numbers by the circuitry of mouse and computer the signs we
make moving a mouse are rendered as denotation only, their
materiality removed, the connotations of the signmaking
disregarded a discarded. And yet, of course the sign still
works towards ourselves.
The sign-making process of using a mouse is complex – it is,
like all sign systems, two directional – it communicates as
much to the self (the reader, here) as to the other (the
text:system). In the act of making a sign is a feedback loop
about making and having made the sign, a sign of the sign
itself as a sign. Holding a mouse, and moving it while
watching the screen cursor track across is a syntagmurgic act,
in which the path of the mouse:cursor is selected from all
possible paths (the paradigm) in a series of nano-scale
cybernetic loops constantly signifying both the position of the
cursor, the relationship between the cursor and other display
elements, the relationship between the cursor and its
conjectured destination, the modification of action by display
Figure 6
and display by action. Signs about signs and signs about signs
that do not yet exist. The reading of these signs is
predominantly denotative, but the mode of transit and the
texture of the syntagmurgy carry connotative values also.
Mouse movement and screen cursor movement are usually
integrated together and happen within a time frame that
convincingly links action with display, display with action,
and connotes values about cause and effect and the reader’s
‘agency’ within the syntagmurgy of the text:system. Such
connotations are implicit in the ‘manners’ of the mouse in the
sense of normalcy and myth. A smooth continuity of
movement, of unproblematised nano-loops, denote the system
functioning normally (a form of phatic communication) and
connote certainty, reliability, trustworthiness, not only as an
operational process, but also a quality of the experience and of
any knowledge gained during it.
The ‘manners’ of the mouse:cursor are complex, the signs that
make up the sign system exist in several imbricated
modalities. To use a mouse is to enter into a sign system that
is in part
visual
the movement of a screen cursor, rollover effects
and other visual feedback cues, the general semiosis
of the visual proprioceptive – muscle tension and
the rotation of joints in wrist, fingers, shoulder,
back, these sign location on screen as much as the
visual does
haptic, or para-haptic
 in that the shape, texture, resistance and yield,
smoothness and regularity of the devices movement
over surface, the press pattern of buttons, both
signify the presence of the mouse and sign values of
interactivity
gestural, or para-gestural
because the hand using the mouse takes on
particular shape and position within the semiotic
process repeatedly and consistently and in this it
resembles signing languages
auditory
action semiosis
para-haptic,
proprioceptive,
para-gestural.
sonic
display semiosis
visual, sonic,
force-feedback
system:text
processes of
event/condition,
retrieval,/calculation,
assembly,
display
reader:text
processes of
perception,
cognition,
decision,
action
including the click of buttons, display sounds, the
inherent issues of sonic spatiality an the general
semiosis of sound.
The signs of mouse read through the various modalities of
their signification are about movement and change and these
function as signs both within the syntagmurgy of creation and
in the syntagmurgy of reception. The signs of mouse function
as meta-signs signifying the nature and status of the signs
themselves, modelling as moulding the hermeneutic process,
embedding mind process in screen display as the wraiths of
Sapir and Whorf wander across our discussion.
Using a mouse involves the syntgamurgic processes of
reception and creation, and these overlay  display semiosis
(which includes any way in which data is given material and
sensory form) and action semiosis, (the ‘self-reading’ signs of
operation). Usually integrated together and happening within
a time frame that convincingly links action with display and
so signifies cause and effect, the two co-dependent
syntagmurgies of reception and creation spin the cybernetic
loop along its semiotic axis.  The integration of reception and
creation, and the experience of those processes, signs nothing
so much as dialogue, responsiveness, agency. In the way that
display changes are evoked by action (the signs of cause and
effect) and in the way in which this happens at many scales
and not only in moments of ‘decision’, creates a sign field in
which the apparent ‘coming alive’ness of the display signs the
text:system as having attributes of autonomy and intelligence,
willingness and resistance, truthfulness and decption.
Because the movement of the mouse and the movement of the
cursor map across both the action semiosis and the display
semiosis, there is a rich play of how the use of the mouse
relates to signifying processes. Using Peirce’s categories we
can describe and discuss the movement of the cursor on the
screen, that is in the display semiosis, as indexical, and in the
action semiosis as iconic. Indexical because the cursor is a
sign that is existentially linked to the movement of the hand
but is not the action itself (much the same as the
commonplace smoke:fire analogy, the cursor does not move
unless the mouse is moved and the feedback of the movement
does not equate to the feedback of an illusory visual surface –
the mouse does not bump when the cursor crosses a line).
Iconic because the action of moving the mouse itself signs
moving the mouse, the sign system of the para-haptic and
proprioceptive integrating with the visual. The semiosis of
action is a sign of action itself.
The movement of the mouse also signs symbolically. The
reader understands through the sign of the cursor, its
movement, relative to other signs, and the visual signing of its
shape, something about agreed processes of action and
cognition. The reader has acquired and uses arbitrary signs of
movement (rarely do mouse and cursor track on a 1:1 scale),
click, drag, double click, rollover – which seems iconic in the
integrated overlay of display and action but is more properly
understood as an arbitrary language, acquired and assimilated,
made invisible through mastery and familiarity, hidden in
myth.
The mouse sign system separates movement and action and in
so doing it signs something about the process of thought itself.
The cursor is directed to a place and then the button is pressed
down, sometimes held down, sometimes released quickly,
sometimes double clicked, it does not matter. In this
separation of continuous movement and discreet decision
cause and effect are structured. The almost idling nano-scale
sweeps of the cybernetic loop that are the signs of cursor
travel around the screen as the mouse is moved around give
way to clicks and decision and the cybernetic loop lurches
along its semiotic axis, larger scale changes of display happen,
patterns of energy change, temporal and spatial juxtaposition
create difference, syntagmurgically form meaningful instances
of display, give material form to data retrieval or algorithmic
operation.
Placing the hand on the mouse is a formal declaration of
entering into a signing relationship. The position of fingers,
the rotation of the wrist and forearm, the touch sensations on
palm and fingers – these are the first sign of an action
semiosis. It is a sign of the signing process that has been
initiated. Movement then, scale mapped between mouse
movement and display is a sign not only to the system (your
action: its reading of a display) but also to the reader. A sign
of  a process taking place, and that sign denotes the process
and connotes its values. The process signed by moving the
mouse is a process of searching around, looking around,
enquiring. While often metaphored as spatial it is usually
undertaken while sedentary. In its sweep of wrist and
integrated tracking of the eye, it resembles cognitive acts like
purposeful recall, like studying a scene, like the active
syntagmurgy of hermeneutics. In Gregory Bateson’s image of
the blind man and his stick, the mouse is our extended probe
by which we get to know about this other world, this
representational space. The sign system shifts from looking
around to action by, bringing the mouse to halt and changing
from free fluid movement of wrist to press action of finger.
The action of the finger here is a formal language of
operation, arbitrary, almost like alphabetical signs, but where
they exist as patterns of light the signs here are muscle actions
bounded by time. The duration of a click is a parameter of its
signedness and meaning, a means of markedness, difference,
affordance. The shift from wrist action to finger action itself
signs a difference in mode of operation, denoting decision in
place of observation and interpretation. This move – locate –
click sequence signs different cognitive states and differing
stages on the cybernetic loop and in syntagmurgy.
The move – locate – click  process of mouse use becomes a
sign for a mental model of decision making and even thought
itself. It signs think – decide – act and requires this of the
reader. Without this process, meta-signed in the use of the
mouse, then, much of the time in the interactive nothing
happens. This sign of process is not merely denotative, it does
not simply sign the process as process. It is connotative of that
process, signing the process with the values of rational mind,
decision making, trustworthiness, agency, presence, power.
The process of signs and of syntagmurgy means that mouse
use, the movement of cursor on screen and the hand behind it,
becomes a kind of embodied probe for our thinking process.
The movement of the mouse signs mental processes, the
cursor becomes the point of our concentration, an
outbodiment of the hermeneutic syntagmurgy.
The common mouse process – move-locate-click – deals with
one issue at a time. It signs thought as a serial process quite
contradicting the structures of associational thought which
underlie Ted Nelson’s idea of ‘hypertext’. This pattern of
mouse use is prevalent, dominant, and functions as a myth of
normalcy about both the systems and ourselves. It signs up a
number of values about the system and its operation, and
about the values of the experience and any knowledge gained
from or through it. Now among the most common languages
used, and that in many diverse cultures and communities, it
functions as a powerful myth of normalcy both of system
operation and responses to the world. The implicit power
relationship of point-and-instruct that has us form
unambiguous sentences from menu selections, the look-click-
and-its-done operation, are powerful language models for the
world. The signs of agency and effectiveness in the dual
syntagmurgy of the interactive, where reception and creation
overlap, become ways in which we believe the world itself
works. All languages become ways of understanding the
world.
But it need not be so. Mouse is a distinct and markedly
artificial language. Although there is an accustomed normalcy
to its use, the nature of the language as being a product of
algorithms is open to a poetic exploration and the works of
artists and authors can extend, subvert and problematise that
normalcy both as a form of explorative enquiry and as a
comment on its mythic structures and, ultimately, political
values.
Peacock [11]
Within the wide sign systems of the interactive, Mouse is one
contributing element to the holistic experience of the reader.
Rarely does any one contributing element stand alone, usually
they all work together to form the signs which inform the
aesthetic of the discourse.
It is important to locate mouseSigns within that holistic. Both
in their denotative operational functions and in their
connotative and mythic values.
Juvenate [10]
AESTHETIC DOMAINS
Taken holistically interactivity resembles nothing so much as
it resembles story-telling because it binds together the
syntagmurgy of reception and creation in an act of
communication which is inherently ‘narrative’ in that it is
time-based and driven by events. Structures of cause and
effect, the modification of meanings by juxtaposition in space
or sequence, connect the instances of action/display within
larger structures of meaning, and those larger structures,
themselves, have semiotic function. And it is in the functions,
effects, and affect of that semiosis that the aesthetics of
interactivity may be examined and discussed.
The narratives of the interactive are of many kinds and it is
important to distinguish among them. The main distinction
being drawn between those narratives which are
predominantly concerned with information and those which
are predominatly concerned with the experience of
interactivity itself. In the first group are narratives of the
interactive where the concern is to give access to an
underlying database of information which is understood to be
more important than the experience of the interactive itself.
This kind of activity is characterised by designs which seek to
make the interactive ‘transparent’, by screen design metaphors
that converge with or replicate as on-screen image, a user’s
‘real world’ experiences. Where the word ‘functionality’
trades alongside ‘efficiency’ and ‘workflow’ in a kind of latter
day Taylorism.
Of the other kind are interactive artworks and games where
the concern is with the experience of the interactive, where the
narrative of interaction is the thing in itself. Here there are
divergent metaphors, problematised interfaces, toys in the
sense of things that are played with for the purpose of playing.
This difference is described by Bolter and Gromala as
Transparency and Reflectivity and discussed in detail in
Windows and Mirrors. “Contemporary culture” they say , “is
receptive to transparency (the window) and also to an
alternative, self-reflective style (the mirror). This latter style,
which was truly avant-garde in the early twentieth century,
has become the aesthetic of rock concerts in the early twenty-
first century. So digital designers and the growing world of
digital entertainment need to master both styles. Digital
interface design needs to master both styles as well.”
Bolter and Gromala [3]
and they go on to comment “We might be tempted to think
that transparency is for “serious” digital applications, such
as productivity software, while reflectivity belongs exclusively
to art and entertainment. But it is not that simple.” Making the
point that the experience of most users is an oscillation
between the two modes, that is to say that the discourse moves
from transparency to reflectivity as the user’s purpose, task
and concentration changes. The oscillation between the
transparency of a word processor application contrasts with
the reflectivity of the graphic user interface as the user
changes from that application to another, as the user’s
concentration moves from application to system operation, as
the syntagmatic processing of interaction proceeds.
Small Fish [8]
We can think of these two kinds of the interactive, the ones
concerned with information and the ones concerned with
experience, characterised as transparency and reflectivity by
Bolter and Gromala, as being points towards the ends of a
domain, or two-dimensional field.
information the interactive experience
transparency reflectivity
The discourse that is the experience of the work is located
within this domain with a tendency towards one end or the
other. “Each design,” say Bolter and Gromala, “is a
combination of these two strategies – perhaps with more
elements of one or the other”. So, productivity software, tends
towards information and transparency and digital artworks
tend towards experience and reflectivity, but both have
elements of the other, also. This tendency is the affect of the
sign systems operating within the discourse. Transparency is
an affect, an aesthetic experience of the interactive, of the
dually-syntagmurgic discourse. Reflectivity, likewise. Both
derive from a reading of the signs of the essentially dualled-
syntagmurgy of the interactive, signs which, collectively
inform the experience of the interactive and define the
aesthetic experience of it, and which are framed by the
‘manners’ of devices.
The paradigm of an interactive text is unknowable. Because it
has a physical rather than material form its extent and
structure can never be seen directly and only parts are ever
seen at any one time (syntagmatic display). And there is no
guarantee that those parts will be seen in the same
juxtaposition of sequence or space more than the once of a
particular instance. This has a number of consequences which
will be discussed here through the notion of domains or two-
dimensional fields. A domain represents a condition in the
potential experience of the interactive, a sign of the quality of
the experience, and is marked at each end by differentiated
forms of the experience of that condition. Domains, as
thinking structures, relate to but are not the same as binary
oppositions in structuralism. What is located within a domain
is the discourse of the reader and the text, (although of course
it is easier to think of these domains as being features of the
text as that mode of ascription is prevalent in the way we
think of the world culturally). The domains, or rather the
reader’s experience of what these domains deal with function
within the semiotic processes of the reader:text discourse as
signs about the text and the properties of the text.
A primary domain addresses where the reader stands in
relation to the text itself. This domain (the locus of
interactivity) relates to actions of the reader which generate
instances of the text (the syntagmurgy of action:display) and
is marked at one end by the term deliberate and at the other
inadvertent. The actions of a person entering text through a
keyboard characterise the deliberate – their actions are
purposeful and are directed towards the interactive through a
device of interactivity they are aware of. The inadvertent is
characterised by an artwork installation in which a sensor
registers the presence of a person without their knowing it and
this triggers an event. A work perhaps like Susan Collins…..
banana, or the warrington museum.
deliberate locus of interactivity inadvertent
A reader who has inadvertently interacted with a text may
work out how the installation operates, say by recognising a
PIR detector, and then proceeds to step back and forth into
and out of the field of the device causing the installation to
respond. In this the reader can be said to have moved through
the domain from the inadvertent to the deliberate. Similarly,
an inexpert typist………………….
This points out the inherently dynamic nature of the domains
and also that within them the location of any discourse is most
properly thought of as a generalised tendency. Within any
discourse there will usually be a range of locations within the
domains (perhaps much the same idea as Bolter and
Gromala’s ‘oscillation’ between transparency and
reflectivity), and the particular tendency at any one time is an
outcome of the dual-syntagmurgy of the discourse.
 The first encounter with a text, the initial moment of
discourse, is likely to tend towards the inadvertent as the way
of engaging with the text is established. Familiarity with
similar texts means that the discourse soon relocates towards
deliberate. If the discourse includes the unfamiliar object, or
unfamiliar processes then such a  movement may be slower. If
an object at first appears familiar but proves to work in
unexpected ways (keystrokes are remapped to an alternative
layout, the screen cursor moves erratically, say) then the
discourse is abruptly relocated to the inadvertent. Across time,
all discourses will drift towards deliberate.
In this domain the mouse:cursor device when operated within
its ‘normal’ manner tends towards the deliberate. It is
markedly less demanding of accuracy than the keyboard (the
screen cursor generally occupies an area rather than a precise
location) but when used as a point-click device it is clearly
‘deliberate’ and connotes values of control, action, decision.
However the mouse:cursor device is relatively easy to subvert
through reframed algorithms that, perhaps map horizontal
movement of the mouse to verticalmovement of cursor, and/or
vice versa, or translate vertical movement to the rotation of a
visual display element. These relocate the (discourse of) the
device towards the inadvertent, but with the general drift of
learning that presses things towards the deliberate. Hidden
hotspot areas drifting around the screen, their movement
dictated by randomised increments and their direction
dependent on the chaos of collisions with sounds triggered by
rollover events – such a thing would be inadvertent and could
well maintain its tendency long after the general principle is
‘understood’.
This domain of deliberate and inadvertent provides an initial
classification of instances of the interactive, and, along with
other domains which are imbricated within the overall
discourse, will direct our attention to the signing pliaces
where the discourse happen – to the devices of display and
action.
As an interactive text is not materially embodied it follows
that all users face a potential uncertainty about what they have
seen or missed, how much of the whole they have seen, or
missed, how what the have seen realtes to the whole, whether
they can find any of it again. An uncertainty quite unlike that
of a book or painting which can be ‘scanned’ or surveyed
quickly across or through their material paradigm.
This aspect of the interactive is addressed through two
domains. The first is labelled ‘missingness’ and the second is
lablelled ‘tmetic anxiety’. This term, tmesis, is derived
through Aarseth and Barthes from Aristotle, where its general
meaning is to do with an author never knowing how much of
a text a reader may have skipped. It clearly relates to the idea
of missing-ness, but here it applies not to the author’s
experience in constructing the text (for there is an important
difference between the privileged maker’s view of a text and
the reader’s discourse) but to the experience of the user,
reader, player whatever you want. These domains are
interconnected. One is about how much the user experiences a
sense of missingess in the text, a sense of not having seen
important material, of other options or opportunities not taken
or followed. The other of these domains is about the user’s
response to that sense of missing-ness, the state of their
anxiety.
incompletedness missingness completedness
low tmetic anxiety high
Forms of the interactive map across these two domains
differently. An information-purposed (transparent) text will
necessarily want to locate towards ‘completedness’ on the
‘missngness’ domain, and towards ‘low’ on the ‘tmetic
anxiety’ one because such a pairing is about an affect (the
experience of the aesthetic) which includes an acceptance that
the information that comes from the system is believable and
dependable.
A text adventure game (tending to reflectivity), with its many
twisty little passages, would locate towards ‘incompleteness’
in the ‘missingness’ domain and could  well move around
variously within the domain of ‘tmetic anxiety’ at times
tending towards the low end , and at others towards the high
end as this is about an affect which includes dramatic
tensions, which motivates further exploration, and this can be
seen to equate with Bolter and Gromala’s ‘oscillation’
between transparency and reflectivity.
Many information based systems include, as a designed
feature, a representational overview, plan or ‘site map’ of the
constituent parts, and many adventure gamers draw up maps
of the worlds they explore. In information based systems such
‘site maps’ are a mechanism for reducing tmetic anxiety and
bringing a tendency towards completedness – advantaging
‘transparency’. The affect is reassurance, confirmation,
valorisation, ‘if you have missed something, you can find it
again, this whole thing can be understood’. The user is made
less anxious because less is experienced as missing. The
gamer’s map drawn out as she explores has the affect of
taking ownership, building mastery, dynamically relocating
the discourse within the domains towards both
‘completedness’ and ‘low’ while demonstrating the extent of
the task that has been undertaken, shifting from reflectivity to
transparency and back again.
Juvenate [10]
The amount of work required during the syntagmurgy of the
discourse of using a mouse may have a good deal of effect on
the domains of missingness and tmetic anxiety. Tracking the
mouse:cursor back and  forth across the screen creates a
density of decision of process within the nano-loops of
action:display, and the repeated cohnitive focussing on
different areas may sign the possibility of having missed
something.
Those domains of missingness and tmetic anxiety tie in with
other domains, mostly clearly with ones which locate the
user’s experience of the discourse (although we may describe
some of these features as if they are properties of the work
they are of course only ever features of the user’s experience)
within domains of ‘cursality’ and ‘causality’. Cursality is
about the pathedness of the text – about how many choices are
to be made, how many paths may possibly be taken, howmany
paths have been taken and remain untaken, how the various
paths interconnect. As a domain ‘cursality’ maps the user’s
experience of complexity of structure, and that experience
connotes affects such as reliability, certainty, trustworthiness.
But the mapping is not simple – a complexity that is
‘understandable’ is more reassuring than a designed
‘simplicity’ in which the user feels lost. The measure is how
the user experiences the connotations of complexity or
simplicity within the discourse which is the interactive.
Cursality may be a product of the number of choices the user
has faced, or the depth of decision they have had to make.
Resolving ambiguities, for example, may markedly increase
the cursality even though there are few choices. The density of
decision making acts as sign for cursality
simplicity cursality complexity
An information based system will usually locate towards low
cursality. Reducing the number of options speeds operations,
creates a relatively uncomplicated map of operations in the
user’s mind. And from that comes a ‘belief’ in the
trustworthiness of the system – a defining characteristic of
what is usually required of ‘transparency’.
Causality, or the consistency of the consequence of actions, is
about the way cause and effect operate in the discourse.
Actions and displays are bound together through cause and
effect and create spatial and temporal juxtapositions of
elements from the paradigm of the work. The experience of
Causality connotes values such as certainty, understand-
ability, trustworthiness, consistency. It is a domain that is
marked at one end by redundancy – a clear almost ritualised
affect – and entropy. Between the totally predictable and the
entirely chaotic, between the transparent and the reflective.
entropy causality redundancy
It is doubtful if any discourse can ever locate at the extreme of
entropy. That which is truly, deeply, or very entropic is
accommodated rapidly by the human mind and its own
unpredictability becomes expected and so redundant.
Discourse located towards, or tending towards the entropic, is
exciting because of the unexpectedness of potential
juxtapositions and because of the thrill of the oscillation
between states, within the domain. Redundancy brings
predictablitity, stability across time and instance and so an
affect of reliability, believability. Entropy brings the thrill of
the unexpected. Games rely on a tendency towards entropy
and employ elaborate mechanisms to maintain it, to counter
the dynamic tension of experience leading to redundancy.
Randomising sequences, apparent artificial intelligences,
simulator models with chaos engines, these strategies of game
play ensure a location towards entropy. Mastery of the game
moves the discourse towards redundancy and an aspect of the
ritualised predictability is the reward of mastery.
Cursality may be signed in the mouse:cursor syntagmurgy
through the density of movement and variation in the
requirements of movement and, as with causality, in the
consistency of cause and effect structures and relationships
within the nano-loops and macro-loops of the artefact.
Conclusion
Working together these domains (and others not discussed
here) form from the signs of the discourse a ‘view’ of that
experience itself. That view is inherently connotative in that it
is value laden and mythic in that it signs grander narratives of
how the world works. The signs which communicate the view
are many and varied, they include visual sign systems,
acoustic ones, environmental ones, and ones tied in with the
operation of such things as mouse, keyboard, joystick,
drawing tablet, etc.
There are well established critical approaches to the
discussion of the visual and the sonic. Approaches to the
semiotics of graphic design and visual imagery, and to music
and sound, which address features such as colour,
composition/layout, typographic elements, modes and styles
of representational imagery, genre of music, the timbral
qualities of non-indexical sounds, the languages of symbolic
sound that are brought into play, a reasonably well-established
and function much the same across many media. It is
important that we develop ways of discussing the relatively
new sign systems that also play within the interactive and
which make it so very different to other forms.
Peacock [11]
Notes
1: syntagmurgy – with no apologies for this neologostic act –
this is a compound word bringing together syntagm (in its
sense of a set of signs drawn from a larger paradigm) and the
–urgy of English words such as dramaturgy, metallurgy,
liturgy, which is rooted in the concepts of ‘work’ – in the
sense of bringing forth through labour. So syntagmurgy is the
act of bringing forth a selection (grammatical in terms of the
language paradigm, or not) from a larger set, either
unconsciously as part of perception/cognition (as in
hermeneutics) or more consciously and deliberately (as in the
use of an interactive menu) or inadvertently (triggering a
sensor). This term relates to, and resembles, Aarseth’s ergodic
but grounds the act of selection in bodies of signs and the
discourse of readings. The concept of syntagmurgy is one of
process not of act, the ‘bringing forth’ is never completed nor
does it finish while discourse continues.
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